The enforcement of Maltese judgments in other EU member states under the European Union's ‘Brussels I’ regulation, with particular reference to judgments delivered after 1st May 2004 in cases commenced before that date by Vella, Julian
ELSA MALTA LAW REVIEW 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MALTESE JUDGMENTS IN OTHER EU 
MEMBER STATES UNDER THE EUROPEAN UNION'S •BRUSSELS I' 
REGULATION, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO JUDGMENTS 
DELIVERED AFTER 1ST MAY 2004 IN CASES COMMENCED 
BEFORE THAT DATE 
Julian Vella LL.B, Dip. NP (Melit) 
This essay was the one of the two winning submissions in a competition held by 
the Editorial Board of the ELSA Malta Law Review, in collaboration with the 
Office of the Advocate General.1311 
KEYWORDS: BRUSSELS I REGULATION - RECOGNITION OF JUDGMENTS -
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS 
1311 This essay was reviewed by Dr Andria Buhagiar and Dr Ivan Sammut B.A.(Melit), 
LL.D.(Melit), M.Jur.(Melit), M.A.(Birm.), LL.M.(Bruges), Ph.D.(Lond.) 
301 
ELSA MALT A LAW REVIEW 
THE ENFORCEMENT OF MALTESE JUDGMENTS IN OTHER EU 
MEMBER STATES UNDER THE EUROPEAN UNION'S 'BRUSSELS I' 
REGULATION, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO JUDGMENTS 
DELIVERED AFTER 1ST MAY 2004 IN CASES COMMENCED 
BEFORE THAT DATE 
Julian Vella 
1. Introduction
On 1 January 2012, some 17.2 million European Union (Hereinafter referred to 
as 'EU') citizens were living and officially residing in another Member State. In 
the same year, it was reported that some 6.5 million persons were working in 
another Member State. Moreover, 45% of individuals aged 16-74 had purchased 
goods online from within the Eu.mz
These statistics are not only extraordinary in their own nature, but they evidence 
the increased importance that Private International Law has come to bear. In a 
world where the global, and especially the intra-Union, movement of persons, 
goods, services and capital is taking place at a rate that is higher than ever 
before, the European legislator anticipated the legal disputes and issues that 
could, and so often do, arise from such movement by introducing several legal 
instruments, most prominently the Brussels I Regulation (Hereinafter referred to 
as the 'Regulation').1313 
These instruments, therefore, are both anticipatory and reactionary, in that the 
primary motive of such instruments, as often evidenced in the preambles 
themselves, is to ensure that the legal conditions in the Union are improved to 
allow the internal market to continue to grow, which motive is in turn based on 
the past experience and knowledge that a lack of legal approximation prevents 
such growth.1314
The Regulation, therefore, seeks to standardise both the determination as to 
which Court has jurisdiction over the particular issue and the determination as 
1312 'EU Citizenship Statistics on Cross-Border Activities' (eurostat) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/EU_citizenship_­
_statistics_on_cross-border _activities> accessed 13 August 2016. 
1313 Council Regulation (EC) 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (2000] OJ L 12, 
1314 ibid Recital 2. 
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to how a judgement may be subsequently recognised and enforced by a Court in 
another Member State, should this be required. 
This essay shall focus on the latter function of the Regulation. The purpose shall 
be not only to examine the procedure by which a Maltese judgement may be 
recognised and enforced in another Member State, but also to determine the kind 
of judgements that may be effectively enforced under the Regulation. This shall 
involve a discussion on the scope of the Regulation and the defences that could 
be raised by a defendant to stop such enforcement. It shall additionally examine 
the changes brought about by the recast Regulation.1315
2. Distinguishing Recognition from Enforcement
It should be noted that recognition and enforcement are not one and the same 
thing. As explained in the fourteenth edition of Private International Law,1316
recognition is the prelude to enforcement. If the courts of a Member State are 
called upon to enforce the rights that one has acquired through a foreign 
judgement, those same courts must first recognise the decision of the foreign 
court, which is however automatic.1317 Following recognition, the creditor must 
use the enforcement procedure laid out in the Regulation to bring about the 
enforcement of that judgement. 'National rules cannot be used as an 
alternative.'1318 
Furthermore, the purpose of recognition is not merely enforcement. The 
recognition of a foreign judgement prevents the re-litigation of the merits on 
which the res judicata lies. This was made amply clear in the De Wolf vs. Cox 
case,1319 where it was held that the winning party to a case could not file an
action on the same merits. 
The fact that there may be occasions on which, according to the 
national law applicable, the procedure set out in articles 31 et seq. of 
the [1968] convention may be found to be more expensive than 
bringing fresh proceedings on the substance of the case does not 
invalidate these considerations.1320 
131s Council Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
December 2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil 
and Commercial Matters (Recast) [2012] OJ L 351/1. 
1316 Fawcett J & Carruthers J M, Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law (14th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2008). 
1317 ibid 603. 
1318 ibid 605. 
1319 Case 42/76 Jozef De Wolf vs .. Harry Cox [1976) ECR 1759. 
mo ibid para 14. 
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3. The Process of Enforcement
The Regulation dedicates the third chapter to the process by which a judgement 
delivered in a Member State may be recognised and enforced in another Member 
State. It creates a simple general rule, 
A judgement given in a Member State shall be recognised in the other 
Member States without any special procedure being required.1321
There are very limited instances where the recognition of a judgement delivered 
in a Member State may be blocked in another Member State. These instances 
shall be discussed further below. However, once the judgement has been 
recognised, 
A judgement given in a Member State and enforceable in that State 
shall be enforced in another Member State when, on the application of 
any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there.1322
The enforcement of a judgement, therefore, begins through an application 
submitted either to a court or to a competent authority, as the case may be.1323 
This is known as the Exequatur procedure, which is regulated by the law of the 
Member State in which enforcement is sought.1324 The application for a
declaration of enforceability requires that one present an authentic copy of the 
judgement in question along with a certificate issued by the Court of the Member 
State of origin that the said judgement is enforceable against the defendant.1325
It is important to note that the creditor has the right to apply for provisional, 
including protective, measures to the Court of the Member State where 
enforcement is sought without requesting a declaration of enforceability.1326 
Once the judgement has been declared enforceable, the declaration is served on 
the defendant, who may then appeal the decision. Prior to this stage, the debtor 
does not seem to have any opportunity of making submissions. The appeal must 
be lodged within one month from the date on which service of the declaration is 
affected, which is extended by another one month if the defendant is domiciled in 
1321 
1322 
1323 
1324 
1325 
1326 
Regulation 44/2001 art 33(1). 
ibid art 38(1). 
ibid art 39(1). 
ibid art40(1). 
ibid arts 53,54. 
ibid art 47. 
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a Member State other than that in which the declaration of enforceability was 
issued.1327
Once the appeal has been lodged, the Court of the Member State in which 
enforcement is sought may take one of two routes. Firstly, the Court may stay 
proceedings where an appeal from the judgement to be enforced has been filed 
before the Courts of the Member State of origin.1328 Case law has shown that
should the defendant appeal, the party seeking enforcement, 
may not, during that time, take any measures of enforcement properly 
so called but must confine itself to taking, if it considers that there is a 
need for them, protective measures against the property of the party 
against whom enforcement is sought.1329
Alternatively, the Court may proceed to determine whether or not to refuse a 
declaration of enforceability. The grounds on which the Court may refuse to 
enforce a judgement are the same as the grounds of non-recognition.1330
4. Grounds of Non-Recognition
Articles 34 and 35 of the Regulation provide the judgement debtor with some 
prospect of impeding the recognition and enforcement of a judgement. Given that 
the defences listed hereunder are exceptions to the general rule of recognition, 
they should be interpreted restrictively. 
This was stated clearly in Case C-414/92,1331 a preliminary reference decided
under the 1968 Brussels Convention.1332 The question referred to the European
Court of Justice (Hereinafter referred to as the 'ECJ') was whether a court 
settlement could fit within the definition of "judgement" under the Convention's 
Articles 25 and 27(3) (Articles 32 and 34(3), respectively, of the Regulation). The 
Court answered in the negative. 
The Regulation provides four grounds of non-recognition. 
4.1 Ground 1: Public Policy 
1327 ibid art 43. 
1328 ibid art 46(1). 
1329 Case 119 /84 Capelloni vs. Pelkmans (1985) ECR 3143, para 18. 
mo Regulation 44/2001 art 45(1). 
m1 Case C-414/92 Solo Kleinmotoren GmbH vs. Boch (1994) ECR 1-2253. 
1332 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters [1968) OJ L299 /32. 
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Article 34(1) of the Regulation states that a judgement shall not be recognised 'if 
such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the Member State in 
which recognition is sought.'1333 
In understanding the applicability of this defence, reference to the Jenard Report 
is apt1334 The report makes clear that this defence must be used not when the 
judgement itself is contrary to public policy, but rather when its recognition is 
contrary to public policy: 
It is no part of the duty of the court seised of the matter to give an 
opinion as to whether the foreign judgment is, or is not, compatible 
with the public policy of its country. Indeed, this might be taken as 
criticism of the judgment. Its duty is rather to verify whether 
recognition of the judgment would be contrary to public policy.1335 
As explained in Cheshire, North & Fawcett's Private International Law, the 
wording of the provision suggests that each Member State is to apply its own 
notion of public policy, according to its own rules and customs. However, this 
could create discord in the application of the Regulation given that each Member 
State may have a unique understanding of the term. Therefore, the national Court 
must interpret 'public policy' in a sense that is 'appropriate in the context of the 
Regulation, and the Court of Justice may intervene if they fail to do so.'1336
Needless to say, this is a rather undesirable situation. It seems that the balance 
between ensuring legal certainty on the one hand and strengthening 
harmonisation among the Member States on the other has not been correctly 
struck. It would make it very difficult for any practitioner to comfortably advise 
one's client as to the true meaning of the term. There have, in fact, been various 
cases dealing with the interpretation to be given to the term. 
In the Krombach case,1337 for instance, the referring Court asked whether the
provisions on jurisdiction in the Brussels Convention could be interpreted as 
part of public policy for the purposes of Article 27(1) (Article 34(1) of the 
Regulation). The ECJ held that the Court before which enforcement is sought 
cannot refuse the recognition and enforcement of a judgement purely on the 
basis 'that the court of origin failed to comply with the rules of the Convention 
1333 
1334 
1335 
1336 
1337 
Regulation 44/2001 art 34(1). 
Paul Jenard, Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (Signed at Brussels, 2 7 September 1968) [1968] OJ C 59 /79. 
ibid 44. 
Fawcett J & Carruthers J M, Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law (14th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2008) 611-615 
Case C-7 /98 Dieter Krombach vs. Andre Bamberski [2000] ECR 1-01935. 
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which relate to jurisdiction.'1338 One could only have recourse to the public policy 
defence, 
where recognition or enforcement of the judgment delivered in 
another Contracting State would be at variance to an unacceptable 
degree with the legal order of the State in which enforcement is sought 
inasmuch as it infringes a fundamental principle. In order for the 
prohibition of any review of the foreign judgment as to its substance to 
be observed, the infringement would have to constitute a manifest 
breach of a rule of law regarded as essential in the legal order of the 
State in which enforcement is sought or of a right recognised as being 
fundamental within that legal order.1339 
4.2 Ground 2: Default of Appearance 
Article 34(2) of the Regulation states that the judgement shall not be recognised 
if it were delivered in default of appearance, where the defendant was not served 
with the documents instituting the proceedings in such a way as to allow him to 
prepare his defence, 'unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to 
challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so.'1340
The law generally presumes that any person served with a document that 
implies his liability at law would take positive action to fight such claims. 
Through this defence, the Regulation seeks to protect the rights of those persons 
who have not had the opportunity to defend themselves.1341
A close reading of the article shows that it is made up of several elements. Firstly, 
the judgement must have been delivered in default of appearance. In other 
words, the defendant must not have appeared to defend himself at any level, not 
even to contest the jurisdiction of the Court.1342 One interesting issue arose in the
Sonntag case,1343 where the defendant had been aware of the civil law claim
made against him in the criminal proceedings to which he answered. The Court 
held that at the moment that the defendant answers to the charges brought 
against him in the criminal proceedings, he is presumed to have answered also to 
ms C-7 /98 Dieter Krombach vs. Andre Bamberski [2000) ECR 1-01935 para 32. 
1339 ibid para. 37. 
1340 Regulation 44/2001 art 34(2). 
rn1 Case 166/80 Klomps vs. Michel (1980) ECR 1593. 
rnz Fawcett J & Carruthers J M, Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law (14th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2008) 617. 
1343 Case C-172/91 Volker Sonntag vs. Hans Waidmann (1993) ECR 1-01963. 
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the civil law claim made against him, unless he specifically declines to appear in 
the civil action.1344 
Secondly, the defendant must not have been served with the documents 
instituting proceedings. The wording of the provision under the Brussels 
Convention had been slightly amended to eliminate the term "duly" and leave 
only 'served'. The resulting effect is that the Regulation would not condone the 
non-recognition and enforcement of a judgement on a mere technicality. Under 
the Regulation, if service was effected, albeit irregularly, and the defendant had 
sufficient time to prepare a defence, then this ground may not be relied upon.1345
The documents referred to in the provision have been interpreted as, 'the 
document or documents which must be duly and timeously served on the 
defendant in order to enable him to assert his rights before an enforceable 
judgment is given in the State of origin,'1346
Thirdly, the documents must have been served in such a time and in such a way 
to allow the defendant to arrange for his defence. Jurisprudence has consistently 
held that it is for the Court before which enforcement is sought to determine 
whether or not the conditions are satisfied.1347 
4.3 Ground 3: Irreconcilability #1 
Article 34(3) states that a judgement shall not be recognised 'if it is irreconcilable 
with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the Member 
State in which recognition is sought.'1348
This ground of non-recognition requires that a previous judgement has been 
delivered between the same parties in the Member State in which recognition is 
sought, and that this judgement is irreconcilable with the judgement that is 
sought to be enforced. 
1344 
1345 
1346 
1347 
1348 
It is therefore not necessary for the same cause of action to be 
involved. Thus, for example, a French court in which recognition of a 
Belgian judgment awarding damages for failure to perform a contract 
is sought will be able to refuse recognition if a French court has 
ibid para 41. 
Fawcett J & Carruthers J M, Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law (14th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2008) 618. 
Case C-474/93 Hengst Import BVvs. Campese [1995) ECR 1-2113. 
Case 49 /84 Debaecker and Plouvier vs. Bouwman [1985) ECR 1779. 
Regulation 44/2001 art 34(3). 
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already given judgment in a dispute between the same parties 
declaring that the contract was invalid.1349 
Needless to say, the bone of contention would lie with whether or not the two 
judgements are irreconcilable. In the Hoffman judgement,1350 the ECJ held that
to determine whether the two judgements are irreconcilable, one must examine 
whether the judgements lead to legal consequences that mutually exclude one 
other. 'Applying this test, it was held that a German judgement ordering a 
husband to pay maintenance to his wife as part of his conjugal obligations was 
irreconcilable with a subsequent Dutch judgement pronouncing a divorce.'1351
4.4 Ground 4: Irreconcilability #2 
Article 34( 4) states that a judgement shall not be recognised, 
if it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another 
Member State or in a third State involving the same cause of action 
and between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment 
fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the Member State 
addressed.1352
Whereas subarticle 3 was concerned with irreconcilable judgements delivered in 
the same Member State, subarticle 4 looks at irreconcilability arising out of 
judgements delivered in different Member States or in third States. 
This is especially important in situations of lis pendens with third States. The !is 
pendens rules in the Regulation apply only to proceedings in two Member States. 
Thus, in a situation of /is pendens between the Court of a Member State and the 
Court of a third State, wherein neither Court stays proceedings in favour of the 
other, the judgement delivered earlier by the third State takes precedence, 
provided that it satisfies the conditions of being recognised in the Member State 
addressed. 
4.5 Ground S: Judgement conflicts with Chapter II of the Regulation 
1349 Paul Jenard, Report on the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in 
Civil and Commercial Matters (Signed at Brussels, 27 September 1968) [1968] OJ C 59 /79, 
45. 
mo Case 145/86 Hoffman vs. Krieg [1988] ECR 645. 
1Js1 Fawcett J & Carruthers J M, Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law (14th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2008) 623. 
m2 Regulation 44/2001 art 34( 4). 
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Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Regulation provide for special jurisdiction rules. If a 
Court, in delivering judgement, ignores or otherwise breaches the provisions of 
these sections, then the Court of another Member State has the power not to 
recognise that judgement. Therefore, though this ground is not listed as a non­
recognition ground under Article 34, the effects are ultimately the same. 
The existence of this ground is understandable but somewhat difficult to apply 
given the existence of Articles 36 and 45(2),1353 which explicitly state that the 
Courts before which recognition is sought shall not review the substance of the 
judgement to be recognised. Cheshire, North & Fawcett explains that, '[i]n 
examining jurisdiction, the recognising court is bound by the findings of fact on 
which the court which gave the judgement based its jurisdiction; this avoids 
unnecessary duplication of effort.'1354 
5. Temporal Scope
One particular issue, which requires further examination, relates to the 
applicability of the Regulation itself. At what point do judgements of the Maltese 
Courts become enforceable in other Member States? The answer to this question 
emerges from Chapter VI of the Regulation, wherein Article 66(1) states simply 
that it applies only to proceedings instituted or documents formally drawn up or 
registered after the entry into force thereof.1355 
In other words, the Regulation applies only to those proceedings that began after 
1 March 2002,1356 the latter being the date of entry into force of the
Regulation. This simple answer, however, raises two major problems. Firstly, 
how is it to be applied in situations where a country, like Malta, joins the EU after 
the abovementioned date? Secondly, what happens where proceedings began 
prior to that date, but the judgement was delivered afterwards? Sub-Article 2 of 
the same Article provides some light to the second question, 
1353 
1354 
1355 
1356 
However, if the proceedings in the Member State of origin were 
instituted before the entry into force of this Regulation, judgments 
given after that date shall be recognised and enforced in accordance 
with Chapter III, 
(a) if the proceedings in the Member State of origin were instituted
after the entry into force of the Brussels or the Lugano Convention
ibid. 
Fawcett J & Carruthers J M, Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law (14th edn, 
Oxford University Press 2008) 626. 
Regulation 44/2001 art 66(1). 
ibid art 76. 
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both in the Member State or [sic] origin and in the Member State 
addressed; 
(b) in all other cases, if jurisdiction was founded upon rules which
accorded with those provided for either in Chapter II or in a
convention concluded between the Member State of origin and the
Member State addressed which was in force when the proceedings
were instituted.1357
In seeking to understand Article 66, one must undoubtedly refer to the 
preliminary reference of 21 June 2012, which defined the phrase 'entry into 
force'.13ss A reference for a preliminary ruling was made by the Supreme Court of 
the Czech Republic in proceedings instituted by an Austrian company seeking the 
recognition and enforcement in the Czech Republic of a judgement delivered in 
Austria against the Czech defendant company. 
Both the first and second instance Courts in the Czech Republic dismissed the 
plaintiff company's application on the ground that Regulation 44/2001 was 
binding on the Czech Republic as from the date that the country acceded to the 
EU (1 May 2004). The judgement that Wolf Naturprodukte sought to enforce was 
a judgement delivered on 15 April 2003, thus preceding the aforementioned date 
of accession. 
The referring Court therefore asked whether Article 66(2) should be interpreted 
as meaning that for the Regulation to take effect for the purposes of recognition 
and enforcement of judgements, it must have been in force both in the State of 
origin and in the addressed State at the time of delivery of the judgement. 
The Court concluded that the phrase 'entry into force' found in Article 66(2) 
must be interpreted as meaning the date from which the Regulation starts to 
apply in both the Member States concerned. Consequently, for the purposes of 
the recognition and enforcement of judgements, the application of the Regulation 
depends on whether it was in force both in the Member State of origin and the 
Member State addressed at the time that the judgement was delivered. 
The rationale behind this interpretation lies in the safeguards that the Regulation 
contains to protect the interests of the defendant. As stated by the Court, there is 
a close link between the rules on jurisdiction and the rules on the recognition 
and enforcement of judgements. In fact, the simplification of the process to the 
recognition and enforcement of judgements, 
m7 ibid art 66(2). 
1358 Case C-514/10 Wolf Naturprodukte GmbH vs. SEWAR spo/. s. r. o. (EC}, 21 June 2012). 
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is justified only to the extent that the judgment which is to be 
recognised or enforced was delivered in accordance with the rules of 
jurisdiction in that regulation, which protect the interests of the 
defendant.1359 
In this case, the defendant company was, at the time of the original proceedings, 
domiciled in a State that had not acceded to the EU. In light of this, the Austrian 
Court will have established jurisdiction on the basis of its own domestic rules, 
not the rules contained in Regulation 44/2001. Consequently, certain safeguards, 
such as those in Articles 26(1)1360 and 26(2)1361 of the Regulation, would not 
apply, thus jeopardising the fundamental principles upon which the Regulation 
was established. Had the defendant company been domiciled in Malta, the Court 
would have reached the exact same decision given that Malta and the Czech 
Republic acceded to the EU on the same day. 
So how would this translate to Maltese judgements seeking enforcement in other 
Member States? Following this judgement, the first thing to note is that any 
foreign Court called upon to enforce a Maltese judgement must ensure that the 
judgement was delivered after the date of accession, not the date of entry into 
force of the Regulation. 
Furthermore, if proceedings in Malta began prior to 1 May 2004 but 
the judgement was delivered after the aforementioned date, that judgement 
could be only recognised and enforced if the Court of the Member State 
addressed is satisfied that the rules upon which the Maltese Court established 
jurisdiction 'accorded' to those established in the Regulation. 
It is the opinion of the author that the term 'accorded' is rather unsatisfactory 
and vague. An English dictionary definition of the term is, 
'To be in agreement, unity, or harmony.'1362 Does this mean that the bases of 
jurisdiction under national law must be the same as those established in the 
Regulation or that they are simply not contrary to the rules established therein? 
Needless to say, the consequences of each interpretation are different, with the 
1359 
1360 
1361 
1362 
ibid para 27. 
Regulation 44/2001 art 26(1): "Where a defendant domiciled in one Member State is sued 
in a court of another Member State and does not enter an appearance, the court shall declare 
of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction unless its jurisdiction is derived from the 
provisions of this Regulation." 
ibid art 26(2): "The court shall stay the proceedings so long as it is not shown that the 
defendant has been able to receive the document instituting the proceedings or an 
equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence, or that all 
necessary steps have been taken to this end." 
The Free Dictionary By Farlex <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/accorded> accessed 1 
September 2016. 
312 
ELSA MALTA LAW REVIEW 
latter interpretation being less stringent than the former. The research carried 
out by the author did not throw light on the proper interpretation to be given. 
The only other way that a Maltese judgement, delivered after the date of 
accession on proceedings that began before, may be recognised and enforced in 
another Member State is if a convention had been signed between the two States 
prior to the start of the proceedings. 
Having clarified the issues relating to the temporal scope of the Regulation, it is 
important to note that the temporal scope is but one aspect of the applicability of 
the Regulation. Determining the actual scope of the Regulation is of paramount 
importance in determining how the enforcement of Maltese judgements in other 
Member States may take place. 
6. Scope
The Regulation is not intended to govern the recognition and enforcement of all 
and any judgements delivered by the Courts of the Member States. In fact, one 
could argue that the applicability of the Regulation is indeed limited, which view 
is substantiated through an examination of the provisions of the Regulation and 
the relative jurisprudence. 
The first chapter of the Regulation is devoted to its scope of application. The very 
first statement made by the Regulation is that it applies only to civil and 
commercial matters.1363 In other words, any matter that falls within the realm of
Criminal law, Public law or any law other than that which is civil or commercial 
in nature cannot be caught by the provisions of this Regulation. 
What would be the resulting effect? If a judgement relates to a matter that falls 
beyond the scope of the Regulation, then the recognition and enforcement 
thereof must be regulated either by another EU legal instrument, by an 
international convention or else by the national laws of the Member State in 
which recognition and enforcement of that judgement is sought. 
However, the nature of the Court itself has no bearing on the application of the 
Regulation.1364 In other words, if a Criminal Court were determining a civil issue,
the judgement delivered by it on that civil issue would still fall within the ambit 
of the Regulation. This was the case in Sonntag, referenced earlier, where a 
Criminal Court determined a civil claim for damages.1365
1363 Regulation 44/2001 art 1(1). 
1364 ibid. 
1365 Case C-172/91 Volker Sonntag v Hans Waidmann [1993] ECR 1-01963. 
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Furthermore, certain matters that would normally be classified as civil or 
commercial, listed in Article 1, are specifically excluded from the ambit of the 
Regulation.1366 
The ECJ has had ample opportunity to expound on the meaning of 'civil and 
commercial matters', which is to be given an autonomous interpretation.1367 In 
the Ruffer case,1368 for instance, the claimant was the Netherlands State, which
brought a claim for damages sustained by it after having to remove wreckage 
from a public waterway following a collision between Mr Ruffer's vessel and 
another vessel, which sank. The Court held that such removal was carried out in 
the exercise of public authority and, therefore, fell outside the scope of 
application of the Convention, and would likewise fall outside the ambit of 
Regulation 44/2001. 
The Bayer case also provided some important insight into the understanding of 
this phrase.1369 The question raised was whether the phrase 'civil and 
commercial matters' would include an order for the payment of a penal fine to 
the State for a breach of private intellectual property rights. The Court held, 
1366 
1367 
1368 
1369 
1370 
In the present case, even if [ ... ] the fine at issue in the main 
proceedings is punitive and the reasoning in the order imposing it 
explicitly mentions the penal nature of that fine, the fact remains that, 
in those proceedings, there is a dispute between two private persons 
[ .. .]. The action brought is intended to protect private rights and does 
not involve the exercise of public powers by one of the parties to the 
dispute. In other words, the legal relationship between Bayer and 
Realchimie must be classified as 'a private law relationship' and is 
therefore covered by the concept of 'civil and commercial matters' 
within the meaning of Regulation No 44/2001.mo
Regulation 44/2001 art 1: '1. This Regulation shall apply in civil and commercial matters 
whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, 
customs or administrative matters. 
2. The Regulation shall not apply to: 
(a) the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a 
matrimonial relationship, wills and succession; 
(b) bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other 
legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings; 
(c) social security; 
( d) arbitration.' 
Case 10/77 Bavaria vs. Germanair [1977] ECR 1517. 
Case C-814/79 Netherlands State vs. Reinhold Ruffer [1980] ECR 3807. 
Case C-406/09 Realchemie Nederland BVvs. Bayer CropScience AG [2011] ECR 1-9773. 
ibid 41. 
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7. Abolition of the Exequatur Procedure
The main subject matter of this essay has been Regulation 44/2001. It should, 
however, be noted that the Regulation has now been repealed and replaced by 
Regulation 1215/2012, which has brought about major changes to the manner in 
which judgements in the EU are recognised and enforced in the Member States. 
Of course, Regulation 44/2001 retains an important position given that the 
recast Regulation applies only to legal proceedings instituted or instruments 
drawn up on or after 10 January 2015.1371
One major change brought in by the new Regulation is the abolition of the 
Exequatur procedure. In other words, any judgements delivered on or after 10 
January 2015 will now be recognised and enforced in other Member States 
without any need for a declaration of enforceability.1372 Needless to say, the 
procedure by which a Maltese judgement may be enforced in another Member 
State has been greatly facilitated. 
A close reading of the Stockholm Programme leaves little doubt as to the reasons 
behind the introduction of these changes.1373 The Stockholm Programme
explains that one of the most fundamental tools in the increased cooperation 
between the Member States in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice is that of 
Mutual Trust: 'Mutual trust between authorities and services in the different 
Member States and decision-makers is the basis for efficient cooperation in this 
area.'1374 It is explained that, 
As regards civil matters, the European Council considers that the 
process of abolishing all intermediate measures (the exequatur), 
should be continued during the period covered by the Stockholm 
Programme. At the same time the abolition of the exequatur will also 
be accompanied by a series of safeguards, which may be measures in 
respect of procedural law as well as of conflict-of-law rules.1375
As indicated above, these changes have not eliminated the possibility of the 
defendant challenging the judgement, as the grounds for non-recognition remain 
the same.1376 The safeguards, therefore, remain very much in force. 
1371 
1372 
1373 
1374 
1375 
1376 
Regulation 1215/2013 art 66(1). 
ibid art 39. 
The Stockholm Programme - An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens 
[2010) OJ C 115/1. 
ibid point 1.2.1. 
ibid point 3.1.2. 
Regulation 1215/2012 art 45(1). 
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8. Concluding Remarks
This essay has effectively analysed the recognition and enforcement of Maltese 
judgements in other Member States, exposing the issues that do arise in this 
process. 
It is to be expected that business will continue to seek opportunities abroad, and 
EU citizens will continue to move to other Member States, be it for personal or 
professional reasons. Therefore, reliance on efficient judicial processes will 
continue to increase. 
As a result, deeper integration in this area is highly probable. Undoubtedly, the 
question academics are asking is, to what extent will the result of the UK's 
referendum to leave the EU slow down this process? Given the uncertainty 
around the true meaning of 'Brexit', and the steps that the UK will take to 
effectively leave the EU, the answer to this question is even harder to 
determine.1377 
1377 Denis MacShane, 'We won't trigger Article 50 until after 2017 - and that means Brexit may 
never happen at all' Independent (19 August 2016) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/brexit-article-50-leaving-eu-wont-happen-after-
2017-european-elections-france-germany-a7198736.html> accessed 2 September 2016. 
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